Will Wilkinson - Latest Comments in Against Fake Libertarian Clarity

Re: Against Fake Libertarian Clarity

starchild — Sun, 08 Nov 2009 22:03:03 -0000

The author makes the mistake of talking about libertarians as being opposed to coercion. This is only partly true. In being for freedom, libertarians recognize the right to use coercive means to protect life, liberty, and justly acquired property. What we oppose is aggression, i.e. the *initiation* of force.

See http://www.isil.org/resources/introduction.swf for a short video that does a fair job summarizing the philosophy.

Re: Against Fake Libertarian Clarity

Dave2 — Mon, 17 Nov 2008 17:05:57 -0000

I'm surprised that the name "Mill" has only come up once here. It should be unsurprising that political libertarians, who'd like to forcefully abolish systems of political control, are frequently (what could be called) social libertarians, who'd like to apply strong counterpressure to systems of social control.

To be sure, in political discussions, political libertarians often set aside social matters. But that's because they think political means are inappropriate for the achievement of social goals. Maybe right-wing libertarians in 20th century America have tended to see social matters as unimportant, but the main historical streams of libertarianism are not like that.

Re: Against Fake Libertarian Clarity

Hazel Meade — Mon, 17 Nov 2008 13:30:59 -0000

Will,
Aren't there some ways in which social coercion is desirable and necessary?
How about ostracizing racists, or social exclusion as a punishment for bullying ?

There are many ways in which societal pressure may feel coercive. But that shouldn't mean all taboos and social stigmas are wrong and should be eliminated (particularly through legislation). There's a role for shaming people into good behavior, and it's much nicer to do it that way than legislating them into good behavior.

At some point, people can decide to resist social pressure and do what they want anyway. Which is what legitimizes social pressure as a non-coercive means of affecting social policy; that you CAN choose to resist it, but that other members of society have a right to impose that pressure when it is in their interest. People can choose not to associate with you if they believe something you are doing is wrong, and you have to be willing to make the sacrifice to accept that other members of society maybe aren't going to accept you.

This is a bit like the political correctness debate. There's a lot of social pressure on college campuses to conform to a particular code of conduct, in order to relieve others of social pressures (I.e. gays, racial minorities). But at some point, conformity becomes coercion. So we end up arbitrating between which social group is pressuring which other group and what the right degress and kinds of social coercion are acceptable.

Isn't it better to stay out of it altogether, and accept that part of life, and part of attaining freedom, for onself, is going to be resisting the pressures imposed upon you by peers, family, and society at large? I've always felt that one must "overcome" those kinds of things (at the very lest) in order to be truly free.

That allows us the possibility of affecting social change through non-statist mechanisms (peer pressure), while also permitting all members of society the freedom to choose to resist that pressure. Which makes social evolution ever more truly a matter of persuasion rather than force. We can't forsee what is the "correct" social norm, but we can allow various norms to do combat in a field of battle unregulated by state intervention.

Re: Against Fake Libertarian Clarity

Abhishek — Sat, 15 Nov 2008 02:11:59 -0000

Will, when you say you favor the Civil Rights Act, do you mean you also support the parts of the Act that outlaw discrimination by private companies?

Since then, anti-discrimination laws have been interpreted to cover even many private clubs. Do you think that is justified?

Continuing on the theme of anti-discrimination laws, how do you feel about cases like this or this where there seems to be a conflict between a right to choose who to live with (presumably a more fundamental liberty than the right to employ anyone of your choice) and anti-discrimination laws?

What do you think about hate-speech laws (the kind that exists in Canada and much of Europe)? For instance, would you agree with this decision?

(Sorry for asking so many questions: I am trying to get a more concrete feel about where exactly you differ with standard libertarian views as far as policy prescriptions are concerned)

Re: Against Fake Libertarian Clarity

GilM — Fri, 14 Nov 2008 22:07:30 -0000

If he'd repeated the word "coercion" at the end would it have really made that much difference in clarity?

I don't think it's unclear. But, it has a style and a character that makes you do a little more work than usual, sometimes. There's usually enough of a payoff to make it worth it, though.

Re: Against Fake Libertarian Clarity

Brian Macker — Fri, 14 Nov 2008 20:16:21 -0000

I've never read such unclear writing. Perhaps because libertarianism is so clear in comparison.

"These libertarians are also notoriously guilty of pretending that their favorite kinds of coercion aren’t. "

Huh?

Re: Against Fake Libertarian Clarity

scineram — Wed, 12 Nov 2008 21:22:47 -0000

Why not?

Re: Against Fake Libertarian Clarity

Greg N. — Wed, 12 Nov 2008 16:46:23 -0000

You sure that's the post you meant to link to?

Re: Against Fake Libertarian Clarity

pixnaps — Wed, 12 Nov 2008 15:17:52 -0000

On the "initiation of coercion", see here.

Re: Against Fake Libertarian Clarity

izforever — Wed, 12 Nov 2008 12:46:50 -0000

Will, thank you so much for saving me the trouble of finishing the post I started the other day. Expanding what you said in somewhat fewer words:

Coercion is not only physical. (Friedman--with his single/narrow-minded focus on physical coercion--had me repeatedly banging the spoon on the highchair recently as I re-read Capitalism and Freedom.)

Coercion occurs even absent an (identifiable) individual or institutional coercer.

There is situational coercion. A worker in a town where the jobs have disappeared is coerced into moving away from loved ones.

(It's true that the ultimate coercion may be physical--the laid-off worker faces physical eviction--but most situational coercion is some steps removed from the physical. The sheriff's deputy is not the significant coercer--the economic situation is.)

Every economic/social/political system--including economic libertarianism--creates situational coercion. (When that coercion is positive, we call it incentive.)

Every tax and spending policy--including one with a libertarian bent--is social engineering.

"If people do better in a system that...[blah de blah blah]...that is justified coercion."

If people do better...

We're reduced to utilitarianism, the greatest good for the greatest number.

“that every man may claim the fullest liberty to exercise his faculties compatible with the possession of like liberty to every other man,”

If that liberty includes the realistic situational opportunity to rise above one's parents' station, it's quite clear from available post-war data that progressive economic policies are far more effective than libertarian in securing those blessings of liberty:

http://trueconservative.typepad.com/trueconserv...

(This without even citing Bartels--who, I should say, you and Manzi only manage to snipe at, not seriously refute.)

Re: Against Fake Libertarian Clarity

scineram — Wed, 12 Nov 2008 12:44:03 -0000

This steering-social-norms-toward-liberty-poor-children-educating-equal-opportunity-regulating-benign-state bullshit was put down to rest very well by Gogulski for good.

http://www.nostate.com/116/the-penalty-is-alway...

Re: Against Fake Libertarian Clarity

Jadagul — Wed, 12 Nov 2008 07:20:01 -0000

Will, thanks for this--you often explain my views better than I do.

Greg N: I think you have explained, rather precisely, why I am politically a libertarian even though I'm very open to the idea of positive rights in theory. In theory, if we could promote human flourishing (for some definition of flourishing) through intrusions on people's liberty, that would be good. In practice, we're more likely to muck it up than not; we compensate for the "oh, sure, we can fix that" bias by creating an institutional bias in the opposite direction.

If we allow the state to intervene only when there is clear and overwhelming evidence that the intervention will, in fact, definitely make things better, we should get a pretty decent ratio of successes to failures. But this criterion is far, far more state-limiting than what we're working with now.

Re: Against Fake Libertarian Clarity

Micha Ghertner — Wed, 12 Nov 2008 03:33:41 -0000

Yes, this. Similar to arguments for rule utilitarianism over act utilitarianism.

Re: Against Fake Libertarian Clarity

mk — Wed, 12 Nov 2008 01:48:44 -0000

I second pushmedia's questions.

If liberty is awesome as a central organizing principle of mankind because it tends to lead to the maximum human flourishing, why don't we just say our central organizing principle is "maximum human flourishing"? It seems very much like it is the latter that is doing all the work here.

I agree with a lot of the criticism of well-intentioned but harmful government initiatives. But isn't it an empirical question whether liberty-reducing programs tend to be harmful? What if we found a really awesome way to implement such programs so that they were really likely to maximize human flourishing? Is this totally impossible?

I guess I'm sympathetic to the idea that while flourishing is the end goal, as a practical matter liberty had better be absolutely front and center because otherwise our good intentions will take over and we'll start restricting our freedoms too much.

It's kind of like how the Bill of Rights puts some rights absolutely front and center, so that we don't dupe ourselves into giving up our freedoms. Libertarianism might ultimately aim at human flourishing, but essentially it exists to say "keep your eye on the ball -- if you reduce liberty you are not helping." As a philosophy, it is basically a reminder to fallible humans about the best means to the end of human flourishing.

Re: Against Fake Libertarian Clarity

Micha Ghertner — Wed, 12 Nov 2008 00:29:21 -0000

TGGP,

I'm not sure I entirely agree with the argument, but if I were to make a libertarian argument that by locking a door you can coerce someone, I would mention the encirclement problem and the common law solution of easements:

Suppose that the states owns all the land along the border. Then we have the same situation as one in which one person buys all the land surroundig another person’s property, thus keeping them prisoner (if they were on it at the time) or keeping them away from their proeprty (if they were off it). Since you can’t legitimately use your property in a way that interfere’s with the liberty and property of others, you are obligated to provide an easement.

Re: Against Fake Libertarian Clarity

Micha Ghertner — Wed, 12 Nov 2008 00:04:57 -0000

Jack,

The left-libertarian project has two components: speaking to the left (that's you) and speaking to the libertarians who do not already consider themselves left-libertarians (they are the people who want to kick Will out of libertarianism). The first component often seems easier than the second, surprisingly enough.

Re: Against Fake Libertarian Clarity

Micha Ghertner — Tue, 11 Nov 2008 23:59:07 -0000

Tim,

The argument put forth by "thick" left-libertarians isn't that the two are identical, but that they are closely connected, causally, logically, or rhetorically. See: Libertarianism Through Thick and Thin. Will here seems to be making what Charles Johnson calls a "Thickness from Grounds" argument:

Second, libertarians have many different ideas about the theoretical foundation for the nonaggression principle—that is, about the best reasons for being a libertarian. But whatever general foundational beliefs a given libertarian has, those beliefs may have some logical implications other than libertarianism alone. Thus there may be cases in which certain beliefs or commitments could be rejected without contradicting the nonaggression principle per se, but could not be rejected without logically undermining the deeper reasons that justify the nonaggression principle. Although you could consistently accept libertarianism without accepting these commitments or beliefs, you could not do so reasonably: rejecting the commitments means rejecting the proper grounds for libertarianism.

Of course, Charles speaks in NAP-compatible language, while Will does not. But the argument remains the same: on whatever grounds Will derives his libertarianism, he also derives his opposition to bigotry.

Re: Against Fake Libertarian Clarity

Greg N. — Tue, 11 Nov 2008 21:06:39 -0000

Will writes, "there is no good argument that justifies state coercion in the protection of property, but not state coercion in the pursuit of other aims similarly congenial to the commonweal."

I think that's the crux of the disagreement here, and as far as I can tell the burden is not on Will to justify his position (accept perhaps to show why these other things count as "coercion"), but on those who accept coercion to protect property rights, but reject it in other potentially liberty-maximizing areas. I agree there are other types of coercion beyond physical aggression, but I found myself initially agreeing with Tim and disagreeing with Will.

I haven't properly thought this through, but could there be a distinction based on the coercion necessary to protect property, and the coercion necessary to protect the "other aims"? After all, protection of several property seems to fall into the Hayekian category of "rules of just conduct of universal application." And though property law certainly has its share of disputes, the state apparatus doesn't need to possess an incredible amount of knowledge to protect property: we just need to know who owns what. Plus, protection of property is a general rule that allows for "all to use their knowledge for their own purposes."

On the other hand, to protect against "emotional or social threats," the state would require vastly more knowledge. Will cites the Civil Rights Act (CRA) as one example of the state protecting against what he rightly perceives as liberty-limiting "emotional or social threats." The CRA likely has achieved most of its objectives, and by all accounts Will is right: that legislation has contributed to "shifting social norms in a net liberty-enhancing way."

But such legislation seems to be the very kind of thing Hayek had in mind when he wrote that:

"... when we decide each issue solely on what appears to be its individual merits, we always overestimate the advantages of central direction. Our choice will regularly appear to be one between a certain known and tangible gain and the mere probability of the prevention of some unknown beneficial action by unknown persons. If the choice between freedom and coercion is thus treated as a matter of expediency, freedom is bound to be sacrificed in almost every instance. As in the particular instance we hardly ever know what would be the consequences of allowing people to make their own choice, to make the decision in each instance depending only on the foreseeable particular results must lead to the progressive destruction of freedom. There are probably few restrictions on freedom which could not be justified on the ground that we do not know the particular loss it will cause."

In other words, if we allow the state to tinker around the edges of society to correct every perceived "emotional or social threat," in the long run the outcome will be net liberty-reducing (even if we can point to some that are net liberty-enhancing). As a result of that observation, Hayek wrote that "freedom can be preserved only if it is treated as a supreme principle which must not be sacrificed for particular advantages ..."

So the distinction between protection of property and the protection against "emotional or social threats" is that the former is a general principle that allows for freewheeling social evolution, and the latter requires social engineering toward particular ends, which would in the long run be freedom-reducing.

All in all, then, I think we can recognize that there are "emotional or social threats" that are meaningfully coercive, while still maintaining that the state is ill-equipped to deal with them (or that, if it deals with them we will be worse off).

I can already think of half a dozen arguments against this position, but I just wanted to keep the conversation going with a potential distinction for the central question.

Thanks to Will and everyone for this interesting conversation. Surely this merits a "Cato Unbound" or a "Free Will" episode.

Incidentally, readers may find this article useful: http://www.fee.org/publications/the-Freeman/art...

And all my Hayek quotes came from this one: http://oll.libertyfund.org/?option=com_staticxt...

Re: Against Fake Libertarian Clarity

binarybits — Tue, 11 Nov 2008 20:36:58 -0000

There is no good argument that justifies state coercion in the protection of property, but not state coercion in the pursuit of other aims similarly congenial to the commonweal.

But that's the whole point, isn't it? Libertarians are precisely those liberals who are most likely to think that state coercion in pursuit of other aims will not be congenial to the commonweal. Of course, other liberals (and political philosophers in general) are also concerned with state coercion to some extent, but they tend to take a more optimistic view of the consequences of state coercion in more circumstances than libertarians do. Obviously, some of the reasons libertarians think this aren't very persuasive. But if you don't think any of them are persuasive, then you're not a libertarian.

If your point is that many libertarians draw an unduly sharp line between coercion to enforce property and contract on the one hand and all other kinds of state coercion on the other, I might be inclined to agree with you. But that's a different issue than asking whether libertarianism is a theory about patriarchy, racism, and so forth. To put it in Wilkinsonian terms, libertarianism JUST IS a theory about coercion by the state.

To be clear, I wholly agree with Kerry in the great Howley /Seavey debate. I think libertarianism are certainly compatible, and probably complementary. I just don't think they're identical.

Re: Against Fake Libertarian Clarity

TGGP — Tue, 11 Nov 2008 19:52:45 -0000

Do you really think that by locking my door I am coercing against anybody? Without any connection to my door I don't see how that is. If I had locked them inside a room you would have a point. Without such a connection to my door nobody has any libertarian grounds to object to my locking it. Switching the subject to sexism, if I am an employer it is my business who I decide to engage in labor contracts with. I am not obligated to hire anybody. If Alfalfa is president of the He-Man Woman Hater's Club it is his prerogative to choose to associate with some and not others and there are no libertarian grounds for anyone to complain that he is using invalid means of determining that and demand that he associate with someone he has chosen not to. This is why most libertarians say we have negative but not positive rights. I however write in The Myth of Natural Rights that nobody possesses any moral rights at all.

Re: Against Fake Libertarian Clarity

x. trapnel — Tue, 11 Nov 2008 19:00:44 -0000

BTW, Will, did I already ask you what you think of 'republican' 'non-domination' views of liberty? When I reread Constitution of Liberty last year, I was really quite surprised by how much Hayek seemed to be within that tradition ...

Re: Against Fake Libertarian Clarity

x. trapnel — Tue, 11 Nov 2008 18:45:50 -0000

Fantastic post. I thought about replying to Seavey's latest, but finally realized I was too frustrated by how obtuse he was being to come up with anything worth reading.

Re: Against Fake Libertarian Clarity

mk — Tue, 11 Nov 2008 18:09:33 -0000

I think that's both basically clear and basically true. The difecta!

Re: Against Fake Libertarian Clarity

GilM — Tue, 11 Nov 2008 17:24:23 -0000

(1) The ones who claim the state should limit its actions to defending against force and fraud (including property rights).

(2) I assume that this doesn't require public schools. And, how much education do children have a positive right to? And, does this positive right imply that the state must subsidize education, or just that parents must provide it (like food)?

I would like to see a lot of norm-shifting towards more children's rights and respect, but I'm wary of starting down the slope of trying to legislate them.

How would the Wilkinsonian Constitution describe what coercive norm-shifting tasks the state could/should engage in?

I'm sure that many coercive projects (e.g. the War on Drugs) have proponents who argue that they would shift social norms in a net liberty-enhancing way. What are the criteria for expected effectiveness? Is it ok with you, institutionally, as long as it's popular enough to get politicians elected?

Re: Against Fake Libertarian Clarity

mari dupont — Tue, 11 Nov 2008 16:43:42 -0000

I'm glad Will finally gave some real-life examples of how Wilitarianism would play out in actual policy. But where do you draw the line? What practices should be outlawed and which should simply be condemned? Unfortunately a lot of laws which "help" me as a female employee would hurt me as a female entrepreneur. I'm guessing Will is OK with laws against sexual harassment in the work place. But I think he'd be horrified at how these laws have slowly oozed into the private sphere; at the last seminar I was subjected to in California, we were told that our sexual behavior outside of the workplace could be considered harassment if a subordinate saw it and was upset by it. Needless to say, myself and every gay guy in the room were dying. So if you're part of the antisocial coercion crowd, be very careful about how you make good on your beliefs.