DISQUS

lobster · 5 years ago

Arguably mental health services have the force of science behind them (or at least there is that pretense), although the efficacy of the services is really what matters, and I don't know this for a fact, but I'd venture to say that religion-oriented services are more effective at helping people than secular services. I've never heard of a secular services helping to cure homosexuals with much success, but then, I guess they don't have the force of Jesus behind them. *wink*

Matt · 5 years ago

Gee, thanks for opening another front in the culture wars, Will.

Tomasi's question obliges the state to draw a line between "organic" ailments, the treatment of which can be subsidized only when performed by accepted medical professionals, and "noetic" afflictions, which anybody with a funny hat and/or a nonprofit can get government funding to cure.

dc · 5 years ago

Actually, a lot of mental health services - namely therapy as in the talking kind - are not scientifically backed at all.

Javier · 5 years ago

It is not necessarily the case that Tomasi's conclusions follow. Everything hinges on whether neutrality of aim or neutrality of effect is adopted. To recap, neutrality of aim says that the state should not do anything that intentionally promotes comprehensive doctrines. Neutrality of effect says that the state should not do anything that promotes one comprehensive doctrine over another, intentional or not. Rawls endorses only neutrality of aim rather than neutrality of effect. Thus if Rawls is correct, he may be able to resist Tomasi's conclusions, as Tomasi's argument hinges on political liberals adopting neutrality effect.

Tomasi's argument is more fruitfully read as "If political liberals adopt neutrality of effect, what would follow?"

Will Wilkinson · 5 years ago

Javier,

The aim/effect distinction is pretty fuzzy. If it becomes common knowlegde that as certain kind of policy has a particular effect, and one promotes it over alternatives that satisfy the original aim equally well, then it is hard to say that one is not really aiming at the particuar effect.

Tim · 5 years ago

How about this: If my justification for funding mental health services involves public scientific evidence, I am offering a reason that can be accepted by people with many different reasonable comprehensive doctrines. If my justification for funding scientology is not based on any publically available evidence that others could accept, but is only based on my comprehensive doctrine, then political liberalism could rightly rule it out. Will seems to neglect a second aspect associated with the reasonable, the burdens of judgment. Someone could say that scientific explanations are themselves part of a comprehensive doctrine. Or that denying funding actually means we must endorse skepticism. But this is a problem that Rawls has faced. Whether he was successful or not, the problem is much larger than just what gets funding. (If I believe that allowing homosexuality to be illegal will cause God's wrath to rain on the U.S., am I being reasonable?) Will also seems to neglect here that Rawls is concerned not with the fact of pluralism as such, but the fact of reasonable pluralism.