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I grew up in urban North New Jersey, a place that now has Tammany Hall levels of political corruption. But around the time Tammany’s Boss Tweed was stuffing ballots, the place where I grew up (now a crumbling erstwhile industrial waterfront series of ethnic ghettos) was a sprawling and affluent weekend retreat for Wall Street traders. Secaucus, if you can believe it, evoked the bucolic back then, and local politics was a matter of deciding who would host the next town hall meeting.
What changed was the drastic redistricting that occurred with the population boom and the sudden influx of industry to what was once a bedroom community. Note that New Jersey is the most densely populated state in the country, and Union City, whereabouts I grew up, is the most densely populated city in the US. When one city in 1870 becomes three by 1900, all in the same county, what you have isn’t what it seems on the surface (a microcosm of state’s rights)- a partisan county boss delegates to elected mayors. It isn’t hard to see that when enough people are living somewhere, the power, as Lenin said, is just sitting in the street, waiting for someone to pick it up.
I don't think there's anything inconsistent with those things.
I think the problem comes when we, for fear of seeming too cynical, are complicit in the unfounded assumption that an institution, or a succession of power-seekers, can be expected to continue to pursue the general welfare despite lots of incentives pushing in other directions.
When I think of anti-war religious leftists, for instance, I see the kinds of people that can strike the balance between upholding a sentiment of civic virtue while speaking truth to power, no matter how much a sense of 'folksiness' emanates from the politicians that apologize for mass murder.
But I still dig H.L Mencken.
I've always been baffled by this claim (though I can understand its appeal to the primitive belief that sheer will can controls events.) If I ever have a daughter, I suppose I should encourage her to spend lots of time alone in unlit parking lots and always say yes if a drunken frat guy at a party asks if she wants to get away from the others and see his room. Warning her that men can be dangerous would simply encourage violence against women, apparently.
More generally, it reminds me of the old Stalinist propaganda that would blame all the failures of the Soviet system on legions of fascist or Trotskyite “wreckers” who were supposedly sabotaging the economy at every turn. The idea that the system itself had serious problems could not be contemplated.
As awful as it is for me to admit, the propagandists had a point. But yes, there are limits to agent-sensitive institutions, and I'd say that authoritarian central planning is it. It simply can't produce the wealth that the commie state agents themselves were witnessing everywhere else in the world. And since the commies ultimately shared the more or less hedonistic and instrumentally rationalist culture of the West, they were jealous.
The incentive for honesty by politicians has increased. Incentives are -- famously -- about more than money. All sides have agreed that systematic dishonesty of the 'Tammany Hall' variety is a bad thing. When you leave politics, you want to have a comfortable (even lucrative) retirement on corporate boards, lobbying, and so forth. Even the odor of not being an honest broker precludes these things, these days.
The most salient point for this post's purposes is his argument that as localities become increasingly liberalized politically and economically, the prevalent type of corruption can change significantly (although certain types of corruption are almost certainly more harmful than others). In the US, the predominant form of perceived "corruption" is typically a function of influence and access rather than outright bribery. But I think (not sure if Johnston would agree) in certain areas of the country, whether it be Chicago, Louisiana, Mississippi, or New Jersey, there is perhaps less overall liberalization, encouraging styles of corruption more akin to Italy or maybe South Korea.