DISQUS

berger · 1 year ago

Yeah, I think you've pretty much nailed the communitarian critique of Rawls here.

JB · 1 year ago

Do you know Gerry Gaus's critique of Rawls? Gaus probably has the best claim to a philosophy that takes the idea of public reason seriously. That is, he doesn't use reasonably pluralism as a point to be used and then discarded in an attempt to justify a pre-conceived conclusion. He means it.

Don Arthur · 1 year ago

Rawls' arguments are useful for people who are already inclined towards liberalism, but frustratingly unconvincing for everyone else.

When I first read about Rawls' theory of justice I couldn't see how it was supposed to work. Firstly, I couldn't see how people who were stripped of all their particular desires, culture etc could be motivated to agree to anything.

Secondly it wasn't clear to me why powerful egoists should care what decisions they might make in a hypothetical original position. Why shouldn't they dismiss it the same way they dismiss utilitarianism and welfare economics -- "Why should I care about other people's satisfaction?"

But thinking about it, I couldn't think of any reasons for self-interest either. Despite anything Randroids might say, there's nothing more rational about self-interest than there is about altruism or nihilism. If you don't care about anything, reason can't help you.

And this brought me back to Rawls. I realised I did care about fairness. And that's how the original position became interesting again.

Chad · 1 year ago

Hey Will, I'm not sure if it's appropriate to invoke the original position here (I'm not sure whether you take this into account in your post or not, it's hard to tell) but the principles of justice aren't things that are up for "renegotiation" once the veil of ignorance is lifted, but we have to choose them not knowing our place in society, natural endowments, etc. So it's not like we choose principles, find out we're actually good at making money, and then get to say, "Wait, can't we redo all this?"

Also, I wonder if you're reading strains of commitment too loosely, as in "strains" are the same as "annoyances." Note that in TJ the strains point was made in context of utilitarianism -- we were supposed to wonder whether the strain of sacrificing all of our good for the greater good was something we could put up with, or whether it would be too psychologically taxing. With JAF, the strain is comparatively milder. We're only asked whether we could see our good as consistent with the good of society, given the difference principle. Of course, he abandons this Kantian reading later -- this may be what you're getting at -- but even then, I'm not sure that the strains you point out are so demanding as to doom the theory (as Rawls seems to think the strains of utilitarianism render that theory psychologically implausible).

Will Wilkinson · 1 year ago

Chad, The OP is a tool for identifying the principles. Stability is a real-world condition the principles must meet. If broadly accepted findings of psychology and social science tell us that certain candidate principles, if actually enacted, would not inspire willing compliance, but would instead be renegotiated, then they fail the stability test. What then? Well you go back and re-rig the assumptions of the OP so that it delivers different principles until you find some that will plausibly pass the stability test, given social and psychological theory. That's how reflective equilibrium works.

bt · 1 year ago

Will,
Your rejoinder to Chad's comment is mostly right, I think, but remember that reflective equilibrium goes both ways. You're stressing the on-the-ground side of the equation--the side that, as many point out, Rawls seems to grossly misunderstand--but we need to think, too, of the ways in which our normative commitments, presumably arrived at by attempting to disassociate ourselves with our position in society, *ought to* count for something.

Chad · 1 year ago

OK, that's right; I got thrown off by the renegotiation bit. But that still doesn't resolve my nagging worry that the "strains" must be greater than a feeling that you'd want to renegotiate the principles of justice or even that your compliance is less than enthusiastic. And I think the point by Bt is helpful, also, although I'd put it a bit differently: Rawls is asking, are the principles that are normatively desirable (in that sense, one's we ought to desire to desire), a disaster for us? He says no. He says this more elaborately (and to my mind, more convincingly) in the neglected third part of TJ. But I don't see what something similar could be said, post reasonable pluralism.

nobody.really · 1 year ago

I’m out of my depth here. But I was intrigued to read Wilkinson saying that Rawls acknowledges diversity but then assumes away any real consequences of diversity. I’ve always thought the same thing about Hayek.

Hayek seemed to espoused a view of social organization that maximizes individual autonomy by minimizing government coercion, but then acknowledges that this system requires individuals generally to conform to social conventions. In other words, government coercion in the interest of social goals was to be replace by self-coercion in the interest of social goals. Nice system if you can get it. But if we start with the assumption that men are angels, doesn’t the discussion become moot?

Many people bemoan the US’s large prison population. But arguably it’s a necessary component of a society that minimizes collectivist indoctrination, in which the spirit of rebellion is alive and well and can only be restrained by force.

Dump hypocrisy. Rather than social convention, let’s have the Republican National Convention: unapologetic dissent and, where socially necessary, state repression of that dissent by unapologetic force!