7 comments

• 

  kevin

  1 year ago

  Yes, that is cynical. True, but cynical nonetheless. The basic problem is the bias toward action. The feeling that we should do something damnit, anything, even if it doesn't make sense.
  
  The other problem is that people think that government is mystical and superhuman, immune to the inherent selfishness of humanity.
  reply
• 

  Pithlord

  1 year ago

  You and Manzi invoke public choice as if that is an automatic argument against government action, even where externalities are huge. This is essentially just intellectual laziness.
  
  Public choice theorizes that people will act in politics more or less as they act in markets: they will try to optimize their private benefit-cost function. Social policy to be enacted therefore has to have a private benefit-cost ratio of greater than 1 for everyone in a winning coalition. The greater the social surplus caused by the government action, the better the odds of obtaining that kind of result. It won't be what the ideal philosopher-economist-king would order, but that does not prove it won't be more efficient than the status quo.
  
  Manzi's example of lobbying costs is fundamentally trivial. If global warming is a real problem, the social cost of lobbyist income will be miniscule in comparison to not doing anything about it. If global warming is not a real problem, then the social cost of lobbyist income is nothing compared to the cost of doing something about it.
  reply
• 

  mk

  1 year ago

  I second Pithlord's comment. If the goal is to prove that the bill is net welfare-reducing, what is needed is a quantitative analysis of deadweight loss and rent-seeking effects, in comparison to the estimates of reduced externalities.
  
  You might say, well it's totally obvious the bill is net welfare-reducing, look at the list of side deals! But the list of deals is not decisive, in particular because many items on the list actually look pretty good!
  reply
• 

  Will Wilkinson

  1 year ago

  Well, I don't think it has even been established that carbon emissions have a net negative external effect, so I don't even buy the argument for the pigouvian tax. In that context, it's hard to see this as anything other than a rent-seeking expedition.
  reply
• 

  mk

  1 year ago

  It's true, if you believe there is no proven AGW problem to solve then it must be a net loss for the government to move money around trying to solve it.
  
  In my view the tax is partly idealism and partly rent-seeking. I don't believe the rent-seeking coalition behind the bill is very strong (the net winners appear to be coastal states and renewable energy companies). So I think the main force here is idealism, or perhaps political posturing since the bill won't pass.
  reply
• 

  Pithlord

  1 year ago

  I'd like to return the compliment. mk has a point. Anti-global warming legislation, no matter how misguided, is a bad case for crude public choice theory. We wouldn't be discussing this issue if there weren't a lot of people motivated by their view of the public interest and morality. It's really hard to believe that the fuel cell lobby has more power than the oil and auto industries.
  reply
• 

  Will Wilkinson

  1 year ago

  Pithlord, "Baptists and Bootleggers" just is part of "crude" public choice lore. Morally-motivated regulation can be one of the most powerful sources of cover for those who profit from them.
  
  If public choice theory is the theory that no one is morally motivated, then not even the inventors of public choice theory believe in it.
  reply