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Liberty in Context
Will, you speak here as if the regulation of leverage were a minor point. But it's pretty much the crux of the regulation biscuit anywhere I've seen the issues discussed. What other forms of regulation have you seen advocated on the basis of the current downturn, and by whom?
This seems quite likely. It is also the reason why economic contractions don't turn into vicious cycles of lower consumer spending leading to businessess laying off workers, leading to lower consumer spending ad infinitum.
While many existing businesses may lose business in a downturn, what prevents this from becoming a vicious cycle is that capital gets attracted to NEW business opportunities discovered by entrepreneurs, which hire people arresting and reversing the process by which the vicious cycle might operate.
Unfortunately there appears to be little acknowledgment of the role of entrepreneurship in recessions in the popular press.
I've always suspected that there is a somewhat faustian symbiosis between the Hollywood studios, production companies, etc. and the WGA that your above sentiment articulates. While the WGA is certainly often at odds with the various business entities employing its members, the mere existence of such a union, and the way it is structured and chartered ensures a certain dearth of competition from emerging talent. This benefits businesses that themselves have to compete in a media market that is made up of players who are increasingly horizontally integrated, and therefore encouraged to homogenize their content.
I have always been curious about your feelings regarding the WGA and its recent strike.
On a related theme, Will mentions the potential for regulation to stifle innovation and entrepreneurship, which is true. But plenty of products can have negative consequences for environment or health which are so long term or cumulative that pure markets simply can't price appropriately for those costs. Entrepreneurs aren't motivated to increase welfare, they're motivated to increase profit. So if their product happens to harm welfare, but does so far enough down the line, or in a sufficiently cumulative sense, that demand can't account for it, they have no incentive to fix their product absent regulation. In a free market scenario, companies could dump those products on the public, make off with their profit, and it would be years before anyone realized the product was doing major damage. So you have the same thing there: a trade-off between welfare and innovation/competition.
I'd push back a bit on your skepticism regarding public investment in the real economy. For instance, having followed global broadband deployment closely through the years, I would say government investment and backing of that infrastructure makes quite a difference. I could easily see the same happening for the electrical grid, and physical infrastructure in general. I think the Obama proposal for an infrastructure bank, in which infrastructure investments are at least somewhat divorced from the seniority of the elected representatives in various areas, makes more sense than what we've got.
I've been wondering about the possibilities of quasi-independent entities similar to the Fed and the infrastructure bank proposal as vehicles to invest in things like alternative energy. You can make fun all you want of those oil molecules waving their flags of origin, but that obscures the large externalities of the current energy market (9/11, $10B/mo Iraq, etc) for which the government (and taxpayer) ultimately bear the costs.
If day to day operating funds dry up then main street is going to suffer some pretty serious friction burns.
Sure, because the housing bubble was caused solely by government policies promoting homeownership. No problems in the private mortgage market, especially not with non-conforming mortgages and independent mortgage servicers. Nope, no market failures there. Move along folks, nothing to see here.
"Libertarians and other free market cheerleaders have made huge permanent strides in convincing the world of the importance of entrepreneurial discovery, competition-driven innovation, and the role of rent-seeking regulation in hobbling these."
The assumption that libertarians and "free market cheerleaders" -- which presumably doesn't include Democrats -- are the only ones who promote competition and entrepreneurship, and the only ones who understand that rent-seeking is inefficient, is laughable. Competition, entrepreneurship, and lack of rent-seeking regulations isn’t libertarianism, it’s basic neoclassical economics. Your entire post substitutes this kind of framing for substantive argument (who WOULD want to "suppress welfare-enhancing entrepreneurship," or see wisdom in "welfare-reducing regulations"?).
"[T]he implied broader point is that financial markets are a sideshow."
And that's where you lose all credibility.
Wake me when you have a real argument.
Value is relational, not absolute.
If he really believes what he wrote, he should go to Intrade and short recession contracts.
Here's a nice prediction for you: within 24 months the banks that ate the remnants of the investment banks will spit them out again, with new names and in perhaps a slightly different form, probably by selling them or otherwise joining them to private equity. But the business will be the same.
There have to be institutions that handle risks the old investment banks did, and they won't work inside the confines of a commercial bank.
As to the regulation issue: We've discussed here earlier that this puppy failed in 4 places. So only 4 reforms/regulations are needed to adjust for similar events in the future, I'd argue:
* ratings agencies must be neutral and independent by law and overseen by the SEC
* a larger percentage of collateral must be held as a reserve pool
* institutions with mortgages must hold on to a certain portion of them
* derivatives and swaps should voluntarily list before the gov't makes 'em
* the annual bonus system must go to a partial-pay, partial-vest over x year model before the gov't outright limits compensation
1) How you can be certain about the claim that "[f]inancial innovation affects growth at the margin by more efficiently allocating capital ... but this is obviously secondary to developments in the real economy..." In particular, it seems that the correct allocation of resources is THE central difference between capitalism and other forms of economic organization. If developments in our capital markets can make our allocation even more efficient, this could arguably give us a significant advantage over other countries. Indeed, this could be a central reason for why "the rule of law" is required to achieve otherwise libertarian economic growth - without the basic correct allocation of capital which the rule of law provides, economic growth cannot begin to develop.
2) You make two claims which may contradict each other:
A. "Financial innovation affects growth at the margin by more efficiently allocating capital to its most efficient uses, but this is obviously secondary to developments in the real economy that increase capital’s productivity."
B. "I happen to think Summers is making a mistake in believing that government has adequate information or motivation to do a very good job at identifying growth-enhancing investments."
If the second is true, how can you claim the first with confidence, e.g., if the government cannot know what is correct, how can you? Not such an error, but I find it interesting that you can make such claims about the right course and yet claim that the government is ignorant about the way to go forward.
Just small comments - take them for what you will. Many thanks for your work.
The question up for discussion then is not whether we should regulate. We're arguing about the structure and nature of whatever regulations we adopt.
The political and public policy point falling out of recent history is that reasonable voices were raised (Buffet, Soros, etc) that said "Hey! There is a feed-lot sized shit-pile of complex, opaque financial contracts out there that no one seems to know how to value, and can barely even price! We need to get some regulation around these babies so we can all agree on who owns what and how disputes are resolved!" In response, Greenspan/Gramm et al claimed "Hell no! The market knows best! Securitize, baby! Securitize!"
Also? Note to our esteemed Blog Host? Anytime someone says "By now it is pretty clear that X", it's almost axiomatic that 'X' is almost certainly not clear, and probably not even true. As a rhetorical trick that translates as "I so badly want X to be true!"
"There is no 'free market'. There never was. There never will be. Laws defining property rights and procedures for adjudicating contract disputes are regulation."
Wait - are you saying that before the first woman traded the first yummy fish head on the beach for 5 cowrie shell beads and a handful of face paint, there had to be an SEC? Surely you jest.
Consider the consequences had the yummy fish head proven toxic, and killed it's buyer. Or it turned out that the 5 cowrie shells were taken from an area of the reef that was a traditional hunting ground of another clan. In the social context of this time, the woman or her trading partner would have been ostracized, branded witches, and probably (under the social contract of the time) traded by her husband/owner at cut-price to the neighboring tribe.
Want to exchange something? There is -- there must be -- consequences should one party to the exchange renege or act dishonestly. Without consequences there can be no trust, and trust (as we're discovering) is no less important to the tribal mind than the modern banker.
Rights arise from the relations and customs of family and civil society, or they inhere in persons. Either way, they are not outlined by or derived from the external state. Taboo is not regulation; custom is not law. Can you not see the difference between tribal traditions of fairness and regulation of the state?
I think with all due respect you don't really understand the force of what you are saying, or its implications.
Why on earth would you want to believe that--say--church law, or tribal tradition, or a family's personal vendettas, have any more a priori legitimacy than the laws a State sets down? In principle I do not see any difference between 'tribal traditions of fairness and regulation of the state'. Tribal elders possess the same monopoly on 'legitimate' force. They are vulnerable to the same human temptations and failings that lead to capricious authority.
In fact, in a Democratic state there is at least a process for changing the laws and regulations by which we all agree to operate. Further, law is written; formalized in a way that tradition is not. I would argue that there is more liberty under Law than Social Tradition. (At this point I mumble about the obligation to disobey 'bad laws' and so forth, but would derail that discussion with an discussion about the design of the processes under which a state might best operate.)
I very well understand the force of what I am saying, and I embrace its radical implications. If we acknowledge that our network of social interactions--of which the market and its advantages are just one--depends upon social laws, regulations, and upon their impartial enforcement, then all that remains is the question of how these are agreed upon and how they operate.
To embrace the times for a moment, we are learning from recent events is how the absence of any written laws concerning complex financial transactions has destroyed the requisite trust, and undermined the efficient functioning of the market. To build trust again, our 'tribe' needs new 'traditions' to guide us when answering questions about property and market transactions.
As for trust, I'm not sure you're aware of the social science studies that show how best to rebuild it. Wharton has some nice ones.
Since I lack webgrrl's restraint, I'll throw in my $.02.
There are many social institutions, and there is a great deal of legislation (I think that's what you mean by laws) around these institutions. Some of this legislation adds value, much of it adds nothing (or has costs and benefits that net out to something trivial), and (I think) the majority does harm.
I think it's a huge mistake to misinterpret this situation to be that it's the legislation that makes the institutions possible.
It's just not true.
As a practical matter, you're right that we're going to get more legislation around financial markets and it's important to consider what form it should take to make things better. But, I expect a kitchen-sink of regulations to come out of this process that will not improve trust or "The efficient functioning of the market."
To expect something better requires faith that I lack.
My point is that these institutions I have been saddled with exert just as much -- sometimes even more -- power over my person than any State. Their power, their authority, is no less real than State power; certainly not in the primitive societies webgrrrl introduced to the debate with her example. Arguably though, in the current situation the actions of the 'social institutions' of Wall Street (they were not part of the state by any stretch of the imagination) have impinged on the liberty of many. Any serious advocate for liberty must acknowledge that.
For some reason, libertarians claim to look to the State merely as a minimalist means of arbitrating disputes between individuals. My instinct is that there are also disputes about the power of non-state collectives that must also be addressed, and part of the task of a minimalist state is to protect my individual liberties against the failure or malfeasance of these collective institutions.
Gotta be careful you don't oversell it though. I would make the claim that the single most important thing regulators can do is to make parties to transactions be as transparent as possible about the nature of what is being bought and sold. And not merely to one another. The overall agora benefits from the information in the price signals sent from the stalls all around them.
Public markets. Public visibility.
sometimes even more power over my person than any State.
Their power, their authority, is no less real than State power