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A Little Mystic Nationalism
So presumably, once we've thought it all through, you'd have no special objection to deciding to put the cream cakes here rather than there in the cafeteria, because we want do discourage cream cake eating, or making pension contributions an opt out rather than opt in, because we want to encourage pension contributions?
And presumably, being a libertarian sort, you rather like the fact that this control tactic is soft, and it's easy for people to choose to do other than the policy maker intends, should they wish to? But isn't that really all that's claimed for liberal paternalism - it's just much more attractive than introducing compulsory restrictions?
Hmm, I can't help feeling that I must have missed your point.
"The point of liberal constitutional rules is precisely to bias political choice in the direction of liberty."
If consituttional rules are really supposed to bias us one way or another to what extent can they really be concerned with our liberty? How can a constitution "bias the outcome in favor of liberty"? Aren't these terms sort of mutually exclusive? I get that liberty can be a good, and not just a right, but once it is a good haven't we given up the premise that political bodies shouldn't decide what's good and bad for people?
The whole example of organ donation is an interesting one. If I'm right, you're afraid that an inappropriate chocie architecture will not foster a concern for choice and individual responsibility...but, again, once you've agreed that such ideals can be "fostered" don't you have to admit that these ideals are not rights at all but values? Indeed, aren't they the most personal sorts of values, the one's that pertain to an individual's body? If the state is going to influence how we think ro feel about such an issue I can't see how it could do so in a way that promotes "our own" decision...
Again, thanks for your response. If you can direct me towards any libertarian literature on this it would be much appreciated.
In short, imposition of a particular choice architecture does, as you suggest, effectively transform the bases of *these* choices from rights to values. However, the impact that such a choice architecture has on *other* causally related choices may authentically increase freedom and choice, without imposing on *those* choices a value of any kind. This is how choice architecture can enhance real freedom while simultaneously (albeit on another level) promoting societally beneficial values.