Will Wilkinson - Latest Comments in The Segway of Social Science

Re: The Segway of Social Science

ANP — Thu, 02 Oct 2008 20:23:08 -0000

NB the word modified a particular club and not necessarily its individual members :)

Re: The Segway of Social Science

willwilkinson — Thu, 02 Oct 2008 02:18:37 -0000

I'll be interested to see if even I agree with myself by then. Yawnworthy!?

Re: The Segway of Social Science

ANP — Thu, 02 Oct 2008 01:54:52 -0000

I'm going to add this blog post to my GCal, September 2018, to see if I've disproven you yet.

And:

http://flickr.com/photos/anp/476143054/in/set-7...

!!!

Re: The Segway of Social Science

The Drunken Priest — Wed, 01 Oct 2008 19:19:26 -0000

For modern man, the consequences of acting on our neolithic intuitions are catastrophic. Therefore, in the spirit of Sunstein and Thaler’s Libertarian Paternalism, I propose the following “nudge.” If ever a crises arises, and you think either there ought to be a law or you want to seize someone else’s money to solve it the issue (both outcomes of neolithic default settings), stop your thinking right there. Rewind and then reset your default settings. Remember, this is your neolithic mind at work. Instead think: how can voluntary cooperation to mutual advantage solve this better than an appointed bureaucratic god? With this “choice architecture” in place, we can rest assured that people will be better off–by their own lights–than they would be under our original default settings.

Re: The Segway of Social Science

Hosting — Tue, 30 Sep 2008 23:20:01 -0000

Good points, i'm always interested in political posts.

Regards,

Hardy
Web Hosting Provider.

Re: The Segway of Social Science

nobody.really — Tue, 30 Sep 2008 18:38:43 -0000

Wilkinson's review of Nudge, summarized: "I agree, but would have chosen different words. Oh, and I'm sneering as I say this."

To be fair, Wilkinson raises an interesting point about choice architecture. Choice architecture recognizes that the choice I make will be influenced by the way the options are arrayed, even if all options remain available to me. Wilkinson observes that the act of making one option the default option sends a symbolic message that the default option is the Right Choice. Wilkinson is leery about creating such a stamp of approval for options he doesn’t like for himself – choices such as having people donate organs or perform national service unless they specifically opt out.

In one sense, this is a very practical objection: Moving to an opt-out world could send a symbolic message that opting in is good, and that the choice to opt-out exists solely at the government’s discretion. (It would also create the possibility of social pressure being brought to bear on people who opt out. Ideally the choice to opt out could be made with some degree of confidentiality to minimize these concerns.)

In another sense, this is a doctrinally challenging objection. I’m often arguing that function should trump form, and that legitimate governmental interests trump symbolic matters. It may look bad to have the White House surrounded by concrete blast barriers; too bad. You’re religion may require you to carry a knife on your person at all times, even on airplanes; too bad. So I’m flummoxed to be in a position to say that we should not adopt a policy that might achieve a legitimate governmental purpose more efficiently merely because doing so would send a symbolic message that offends me.

I’ll noodle on this. But more generally, Nudge seems pretty benign to me.

Re: The Segway of Social Science

HappyDork — Mon, 29 Sep 2008 23:18:23 -0000

Yep Segways are dorky - and tons of fun. Whee! You've obviously never ridden one for very long. They just have an awesome retro-Jetsons feel, much different than a bike.

Re: The Segway of Social Science

berger — Mon, 29 Sep 2008 22:37:45 -0000

Wow - this seems pretty caustic...especially when you seem to grant their central premise: there is no such thing as neutral choice architecture. Perhaps S and T don't emphasize this enough to your liking (though you maintain, simultaneously, that they "make a great deal of the idea") but once you've agreed to this empirical observation (done, of course, by those elitist scientists...with all their knowledge) the notion of freedom that you want to maintain is highly curtailed - and thus your own slippery slope argument is unconvincing. Thus you end up simultaneously warning against any encroachment on freedom and granting that freedom ain't what it used to be. You're already on the slippery slope.
In this way, your complaint that, in the end, the libertarianism of libertarian paternalism is secured only "good will" is both flat and true at the same time. Yes, like most political arrangements, LP would be L only to the extent that there exists some form of will behind it. And, yes, paternalism (being natural) would be ineluctable - but this is because it is inevitable while libertarianism is not. This leaves you in the especially precarious position of embracing "realignment" on the psychological level while chastising it on the level of policy. Why does it scare you in one case and not in another? Does this become a quarrel not about freedom but efficiency and/or (gulp) expertise?

(Damn Elites!! Here they come again with all their crazy science talk.)

Re: The Segway of Social Science

mk — Mon, 29 Sep 2008 20:53:08 -0000

Good points.

Re: The Segway of Social Science

hlm — Mon, 29 Sep 2008 20:51:41 -0000

"dork chariot" is the most euphonious phrase ever conjured from the humble shards of American English.

I genuflect before you.

Re: The Segway of Social Science

Publius — Mon, 29 Sep 2008 20:24:44 -0000

Will, I don't object to anything in particular in your critique, however, I do wonder if you are throwing out the baby with the bath water.

I agree that the idea of choice context being important isn't revolutionary, but their focus on choice architecture does indeed appeal to my libertarian side as well as my large-D Democrat tendencies, which agree that more choice isn't always going to lead to better outcomes.

I thought Medicare Part D and 401k plans were excellent examples of the roll of choice architecture. And while you are right that the book is filled with cutesy examples of humans failing to acts as "econs," these examples are not cutesy at all.

Furthermore, while the idea behind choice architecture is simple, I do think they put forth a good (if static-filled) argument that "planned" choice architecture could lead to much better outcomes than unplanned.

Frankly, most libertarians already have acknowledged the role of choice architecture. Look at education, most would acknowledge that giving parents an actual VOUCHER that can only be used for schools will lead to better outcomes than simply giving them cash -- the same for food stamps, etc. And heck, that's more paternalistic than the opt-out architecture that Thaler/Sunstein put forth!

(I realize that many will say they don't support vouchers either, or that if they do support redistribution to the poor, they just want the Friedman lump sump. I'm not talk to you.)

Re: The Segway of Social Science

John Markley — Mon, 29 Sep 2008 19:32:16 -0000

Great review. I'm always interested in the language of politics, so I especially liked the part on the linguistic contortions/mutilations that Thaler and Sunstein go though to make "paternalism" sound unobjectionable. (I've occasionally seen conservatives try to take the ugly edge off of "censorship" using exactly the same tactic.)